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点, 在实际网络中有着广泛的应用前景. 在开放型的网络中, 系统的信任和可靠
运行是通过综合机密性、数据完整性、认证、授权这几个标准要素来建立的. 因
此涉及到的各主要关键技术包括密钥建立、加密技术、数字签名、身份认证等
等. 既要保证较高的计算和通信效率, 又要保证安全性. 本文在前人的研究基础
上, 主要做了以下几个方面的工作:
首先, 构建无证书的密钥协商协议. 重点是无证书的非交互的认证密钥协商



















方案. 门限密钥生成方案是一种特殊的多中心的密钥生成方案. 但是, 在实际应




























Public key authentication is a main component of public key cryptography. The
main difficulty today in developing secure systems based on public-key cryptog-
raphy is not the problem of choosing appropriately secure algorithms or imple-
menting those algorithms. Rather, it is the deployment and management of in-
frastructures to support the authenticity of cryptographic keys: it is necessary to
provide an assurance to the user about the relationship between a public key and
the identity (or authority) of the holder, together with the corresponding private
key. In a traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), this assurance is delivered
in the form of certificate, essentially a signature by a Certification Authority
(CA) on a public key. PKI is commonly considered to be expensive because of
the issues associated with certificate management, including revocation、storage
and distribution and the computational cost of certificate verification. Identity-
based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), first proposed by Shamir, tackles the
problem of authenticity of keys in a different way to traditional PKI. In ID-PKC,
an entity’s public key is derived directly from certain aspects of its identity. Pri-
vate keys are generated for entities by a trusted third party called a Private Key
Generator (PKG). The direct derivation of public keys in ID-PKC eliminates the
need for certificates and some of the problems associated with them. However,
the dependence on a PKG introduces key escrow to such a cryptosystem. More-
over, ID-PKC requires secure channels between users and PKG to deliver private
keys. For these reasons, it seems that the use of ID-PKC may be restricted to
small, closed groups or to applications with limited security and much efficiency
requirements. Certificateless public-key cryptography (CL-PKC), introduced by
Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003, is intended to solve the key escrow issue which
is inherent in ID-PKC, while at the same time, eliminate the use of certificates
as in the conventional PKI. In CL-PKC, a user’s private key is comprised of two
parts: one generated by a Key Generation Center (KGC) and associated with














parities (include the KGC). Knowing only one of them should not be able to im-
personate the user and carry out any of the cryptographic operations as the user.
CL-PKC alleviates the key escrow problem as we have in ID-PKC, at the same
time, reduces the cost and simplifies the use of the technology when compared
with conventional PKI.
Some of the purpose for which public-key cryptography has been applied
are: key establishment, confidential message transmission, identification systems,
authentications and non-repudiation. So we study these topics in certificateless
public-key cryptography. The main contributions of our paper are:
Firstly, key agreement protocols are one of the fundamental primitives of
cryptography. We propose some new certificateless authenticated key agreement
protocols. The first two protocols are non-interactive, which have obvious ad-
vantages in the amount of computation and communication. Another interactive
key agreement protocol with perfect forward secrecy is also proposed. The last
two protocols can be used to establish keys between members of distinct domains
(with different master keys).
Secondly, certificateless key issuing schemes, with multi-key generation cen-
ter are proposed, by using secret sharing schemes. Threshold key issuing schemes
are very particular. However, in the real life, players (or serves) are usually have
different levels of importance: they can have different privileges or computational
re- sources, and enjoy different levels of protection against possible attacks, for
example. For this reason, it is important to design key issuing schemes with
multi-KGC that work properly in the case of general access structures, not only
in the threshold case. Our schemes effectively solve the problem of single of
failure and efficiency bottleneck, enhance the system’s robustness and security.
Finally, we propose two certificateless distributed ring signature schemes.
The first one can be used for general families of possible signing subsets, and
the second one is more efficient for threshold families of subsets. Our schemes
retain the desirable properties of identity-based cryptography without key escrow,
therefore actually possess the alleged unconditional unforgeability.














Classic Diffie-Hellman Problems or the Belinear Diffie-Hellman Problems).
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